THE A Weekly Newspaper and Review.

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Dum vobis gratulamur, animos etiam addimus ut in incceptis vestris constanter maneatis.

F rom th e B r i e f o f H is H olin ess to The Tablet, J u n e 4 , 1870.

Voi. 36. No. 1584. L ondon, A ugust 20, 1870.

P rice 5 L Stamped 6d.

[Registered for Transmission Abroad.

C hronicle of the Week : Sus­

pense.—Tactics of the 14th.— More Severe Fighting.—Strasburg.—Naval Battle.—The French Ministry.—State of Paris.—The Fruits of Deception.— France and Rome.—The Views of Prussia.— Motives of Prussia.— Prussia Imperial.—French Army Chaplains. —The Duty of a Patriotic Clergy. The Correspondents.—The Sovereigns. — Death of Farragut.— Elections.—Latest. . . . 221 L eaders:

The War ..... 225 The “ Morale ” in Warfare . . 226 Is the Definition actually Binding? 227 Prussia and her Catholic Soldiers. 228 The Session ..... 228

CONTENTS.

L eaders (continued):

Peter’s Pence . . . . 230 English Administrations and Catholic

Interests ;—III. George II (continued) . . . . . . 230 The Anglican Movement :

Anger of the Ritualist Papers at the late Decree of the Council. —Language about their own Protestant Bishops, &c. . . 231 R eviews :

Prophecies on the Church and

Revolution, Anti-Christ, and the Last Times.................................... 232 The Church of God and the

Bishops . . . . . 234 Short Notices : Histoire de la

Terreur, 1792-1794.—Pillippe Le

Bel, ses desseins, ses actes, son influence.— Les Péchés de la Langue et la Jalousie dans la Vie des Femmes ; Suivis de Conférences sur les jugements téméraires, la patience et la grace.—De Domini Nostri Jesu Christi D i v i n i t a t e .....................................234 Correspondence :

The Papal Army . . . .235 Dr. Tait on Intercommunion . 235 L etter from R ome ; The French

Reverses.—The Pope.—The Papal Zouaves.—Italy.—The Situation. —Prussia and Italy.—Prussia and France.—Local.—Church News.—

Military. — Italy. —Prussia and Rome.—Rome Healthy • 237 R ecord of the Council . 238 Diocesan News : Westminster .

Southwark .

Birmingham .

Clifton .

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S a lfo rd ..................................... . 240 Ireland ........................................ . 240 The War .... . 241 Memoranda :

Educational . . . . . 244 Literary • 245 Fine Arts .... •245 General News • 245

CHRONICLE OF THE WEEK.

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I ' ILL Wednesday evening we in England were somewhat in the position of the non-combatants in Brussels during the memorable suspense of Waterloo. Weknew that great battles were raging, and that two Empires were in the crisis of their fate ; and we had grounds for suspecting that the scale was not inclining in Napoleon’s favour ; we knew that his army was everywhere giving ground ; and if the end of the military science be to advance, then not he, but Prussia was winning. If, as was asserted, Metz had been “ turned that is, if the enemy had made good their footing in its rear, on the side towards Paris, then things were looking bad for France. We knew, in efiect, more of what was going on near the Moselle than those trembling expectants knew of the bloody business that was being transacted about jemappes and Quatre Bras ; we seemed to hear (through the distance) the boom of the cannon, the roll of the musketry, the roar of the shells, and the tearing shriek of the mitrailleuse, but we could not penetrate the thick cloud of battle smoke, or know, what very few probably on the field itselfknew, which scale was rising to victory and which sinking to disaster. On Saturday night it was known in London that the bulk of the P’rench army had withdrawn across the Moselle to Metz, although it had taken up a position on the river Nied, which it seemed prepared to defend. The Emperor’s departure with his son from Metz was in itself a fact of no cheering import, and the tone of his parting address, written whilst his army was fighting in the front, resembled too closely the tone of his despatches to Paris last week, and tended but little to neutralize the depressing influence of the fact which it announced, the fact of his departure. It said that His Majesty was going— going “ to combat the invasion,” but whither it did not mention. To call Metz a Bulwark of France which those whom he addressed were expected to defend was but to give alarming significance to the fact that the invading host might then almost be descried from its bastions. Next we had copies of telegrams from the pens of the Imperial and Royal combatants themselves, addressed to their respective august consorts; they were published in London on Monday evening; but beyond confirming the fact, already known, that a battle or battles had been fought that day, they did nothing to dissolve the spell of public suspense. In fact, they were contradictory. The Emperor dated from Longeville, a place about half way between Metz and Chalons, said that the Prussians had been “ repulsed with considerable losses.” The King dated from Herny, the Prussian head-quarters, and said, “ A victorious battle has been fought.” Both doubtless wrote as they then believed, and as things then appeared to them-

New Series. No. 93.

selves. But these telegrams did nothing to relieve the suspense, and they were almost everything we have had of information bearing any authentic impress up to the moment when we write.

The truth appears to be that, as we learnt the ^UthF fr0m c*esPatc^ of Marshal Bazaine, it had been resolved by the French commanders, to begin a general retreat in the direction of Chalons, and not to give battle in front or at all in the neighbourhood of Metz. Retreat before an invader too much resembles defeat, but a Fabian policy was evidently the right policy, or perhaps the only alternative, for the defenders ; and it was contrarily the interest of the invaders to force on, if possible, a general engagement. First of all, provisions had run short at Metz ; the whole army (incredible as it may seem) is represented by reliable accounts to have been for several days suffering under a deficiency of food; the nearer it could approach the sources of its supplies the more would this capital evil be alleviated. Next, the longer a battle could be delayed the more must the reinforcements, which the levy en m asse is now pouring in, augment its ranks, so fearfully decimated by the Prussian fire. Lastly, delay, which would swell the French forces, must decrease those of the Prussians the farther it advanced into the enemy’s country. We know, from Prussian sources of information, such as the K oh iisch er-Z eitu ng, that the Prussian losses have already reached the terrible total of ninety thousand men. Clearly it was the right thing for the French to avoid the decisive battle as long as possible; and for the Prussians to attack if they could, and prevent the withdrawal of the French from the line of the Moselle with a view to retire on Chalons. The Prussians claim to have caused the retrograde movement of the French, but it is evident from their own despatches that the anabasis was already in progress when they commenced the attack. It was vigorously repelled by the troops under the command of General Decaen, General Lamirault supporting him ; the events ensued which are described by the King in his despatch of Tuesday as “ a very bloody fight along the whole line.” Reuter despatches a telegram from the spot which makes the Prussians lose on that day 40,000 men ; to which statement,asbeing obviously incredible, the note is appendedr — “ So received at Reuter’s office.” We have commented more at length elsewhere upon these telegrams and endeavoured, as far as it seemed possible, to reconcile their contradictions. The attempt is arduous enough ; how much more so must it be, upon such slender grounds, to write, as our morning contemporaries think themselves in duty bound to do daily, elaborate essays upon the strategical conduct ’ of the war and to apportion with Rhadamanthine exactitude not only their respective merits to each commander] but the sill

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