AUTOBIOGRAPHY of G. K. CHESTERTON-«»™»«*.

THE TABLET A WEEKLY NEWSPAPER AND REVIEW

ESTABLISHED 1840 REG ISTERED AS A N EW SPA PER

VOL. 168 No. 5029

LONDON SEPTEMBER 26th, 1936

SIXPENCE

PRINCIPAL CONTENTS

THE WORLD WEEK BY WEEK

SPAIN AND GENEVA ; THE UNDERLYING ISSUE : THE TURKS ; THE ABYSSINIAN CREDENTIALS ; CARDINAL PACELLI ; CANADIAN BROADCASTING LEADING ARTICLES........................................ 404

ANTI-RELIGIOUS BROADCASTS ; HISTORY MADE EASY ; ASTROLOGY AND FALSE PRETENSIONS THE SPAIN I S A W ........................................ 405

By RAYMOND LACOSTE AGE AND THE EPISCOPAL OFFICE . . 407 ON FALSE AUTHORITY ............................. 409

By HILAIRE BELLOC ROME LETTER ........................................ 410 VIENNA LETTER ........................................ 411 DUBLIN LETTER ........................................ 412 THE CHURCH ABROAD ............................. 413

401

AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY, I V ............................. 416

By G. K. CHESTERTON BOOKS OF THE WEEK ............................. 420

HENRIETTA MARIA ; TROPHY OF ARMS ; LORD BALFOUR ; PROFITS OF WAR CHESS AND CROSSWORD.............................424 LETTERS TO THE ED ITO R ............................. 425 ARCHBISHOP OF EDINBURGH’S

P A S T O R A L ................................................... 427 CONSECRATION AT LEEDS . . . 430 THE CALENDAR 432 APOSTOLATE OF THE COUNTRYSIDE . 432

THE WORLD WEEK BY WEEK Spain and Geneva

Some Frenchmen on Portugal

As the cause of the Left in Spain sustains successive defeats, its partisans outside, particularly in France, grow increasingly angry at the undisguised and active sympathy which Portugal is showing for the cause of the Right. Politicians of the Left in France, like the Socialist Zyromski, and M. Du Clos, the secretary of the French Communist Party, are blaming Great Britain for compelling the French Government to agree to nonintervention, and then putting no pressure upon Portugal. Although officially it was M. Blum himself who first proposed non-intervention, he is declared to have acted at the instigation of Britain, and under a threat that the British would not consider themselves bound by their Locarno pledges should France and Germany slide into hostilities as the result of supporting opposing sides in Spain. The contingency is extremely interesting, because it was one that played no part in the original Locarno discussions. Then the age-old opposition of France and Germany was envisaged in terms of national power, represented in alliances and geographical frontiers. In the ten years since Locarno, something new has arisen. M. Blum today is maintaining his precarious authority over the French Communist party, by arguing that a more violent support of Madrid might expose France to a threat from Germany under circumstances, in which, for the first time, the French people would not be united against the enemy. The British Government negotiated Locarno, explaining at the time that it represented the extreme commitment which British public opinion would accept. The Dominions did not like it, and it created a new and unresolved situation between the Dominions which are not bound by the agreement and Great Britain which is.

It is obvious that no British Government could hope for a united country at its back in an attempt to use Locarno as a reason for supporting France in a Popular Front war. It is the settled policy of the French that at all costs the understanding with Britain must be maintained.

M. Zyromski said rather naively that in France they had always assumed that Portugal was a kind of dependency of Great Britain. Portugal had followed Britain into the war against Germany, and so it was thought that a lead from Whitehall would be sufficient to secure real neutrality in the great crisis in the Peninsula today. In fact, the die is cast, and Portugal survives or falls with the fortunes of battle in Spain. Left wing journalists, like the News Chronicle correspondent in Lisbon, write that there is now no prospect of a revolutionary rising in Portugal, but that the victory of the Left in Spain would be the occasion for it. The Portuguese are invited to take risks incomparably greater than those faced by any of the other powers, and they are not being offered any comfortable guarantees.

There is talk now of bringing into play the machinery of the League of Nations to secure observance of neutrality. The Abyssinian delegates are at Geneva, as lively reminders of the gulf between Geneva resolutions and effective protection, and the Portuguese cannot be expected to smooth the path of a great power by sacrificing their vital interest in the success of the Right in Spain.

That success has come considerably nearer in the last week. The Madrid Government does not now conceal the gravity of its emergencies. It is concentrating its forces for the defence of the capital, but it has already abandoned the first line it attempted to defend. An important sidelight is afforded in a recent military study in the book, Abyssinia Stop Press, by Major-General Fuller, of the causes of the Abyssinian debacle. The Abyssinian forces had many points in common with the Red Militia in Spain. They, too, fought in masses with much individual courage, but with little training and inferior equipment, and it was proved that such forces can achieve little or nothing against organised aeroplane attack. The admitted superiority in the air now enjoyed by General Franco, has made