THE TABLET A WEEKLY NEWSPAPER AND REVIEW

ESTABLISHED 1840 REGISTERED AS A NEWSPAPER

VOL. 171 No. 5119

LONDON JUNE 18th, 1938

SIXPENCE

IN THIS ISSUE

ON THE BIBLE IN ENGLISH

I —THE ENGLISH PEOPLE AND THEIR BIBLE

By T. S. Gregory

SI.—THE DQUAY VERSION

By Mgr. Ronald Knox

HI.—MYLES CO VERB ALE AND HIS VERSION

By Hugh Pope, O.P.

THE YOUTH OF CATHOLIC SPAIN

Impressions of a Visit By Alfonso de Zulueta

IN DEFENCE OF CARDINAL INNITZER

By the Archbishop of Salzburg Full List o f Contents on page 792.

THE WORLD WEEK BY WEEK The Fall of Castellón

The fall of Castellón is likely to have a number of far-reaching consequences. I t is a provincial capital, the thirty-seventh provincial capital to pass under Nationalist control, and it is the most important place on the East coast which the Nationalists have so far occupied. But the particular importance of its capture lies in the further proof of the great military superiority o f the Nationalists. It has been of extreme importance for the diplomatic game being played with much skill by Señor Negrin and his associates to spread the impression that the two sides are not unevenly matched, and the unhappy conscripts were told that Castellón was to be defended to the last gasp. The capture completes a series of operations in very difficult country, toy which the Nationalists have succeeded in their favourite operation, creating pockets by advances to •either side of an enemy position and then surrounding it, cutting it off, and straightening out a new line. These operations were delayed by the bad weather as well as by the advantage the countryside gave to the defence, and the next stretch of country, between Castellón and Valencia, offers far fewer military difficulties. Throughout the course of these operations the Nationalist bulletins have been unexaggerated and precise, and the advance has been a characteristic example of General Franco’s patience and ability to make haste slowly. The Proposal for a Special Harbour

There only remain some four or five harbours on the East coast of Spain in the hands of the Negrin ministry. General Franco’s proposal to treat one of these as a protected port to which British and other shipping could go is a practical suggestion to which we hope the British Government will listen. The Nationalists stipulate that the shipping shall not, of course, attempt to carry munitions, or armaments, or certain other commodities, and the value of the proposal will largely turn on what those commodities are. If the Nationalists consider contraband in its traditional sense of articles directly used for weapons, the proposal is a reasonable one, and the supervision could, presumably, easily be arranged by an extension of the system, already in force, of Non-Intervention observers. Alicante, for example, is not threatened as Valencia is, and could through the next few weeks become a safe port.

Mr. Chamberlain gave little encouragement to those of his critics who would like to see the British Fleet occupying and holding the bases upon which what remains of the Republican military effort now depends. He had little difficulty in showing that any such strong action would be the abandonment of the policy hitherto followed. It would be its abandonment at a most pointless time, too late in the day to do more than delay the Nationalist victory.

Indeed, at the moment, the whole British effort is in the other direction. I t is concerned with getting the French popular Front to cut its losses in Spain and to agree to that re-imposition of frontier control which can lead to the withdrawal of foreign participants. Spaniards are very good at defensive war, but provided the leaders in Barcelona are not compelled to resist to the end, and are allowed to get out of the country, their diplomatic defeat will quickly be followed by the crumbling of a military effort whose main purpose is to influence opinion abroad.