THE TABLET May 23rd, 1959, VOL. 213, No. 6209
Published as a Newspaper
THE TAB! . I A WEEKLY NEWSPAPER & REVIEW
Pro Ecclesia Dei, Pro Regina et Patria
FOUNDED IN 1840
MAY 23rd, 1959
N1NEPENCE
Change in the Electorate: Prosperity, Television and Maturity Religion in the Middle East: New Ways for Arabs and Jews. By Gunnar Kumlien Material Progress in Fifty Years: Since M asterm an’s Survey. By E. L, Way Wisdom and Happiness : The Western Tradition. By Kenelm Foster, O P . Critics’ Columns : Notebook : Book Reviews : Letters : Chess
DIGGING IN
T H E Russians are apparently expecting the Foreign
Ministers’ Conference to last for many weeks more. This deduction rests on their having extended their special communication arrangements with the Swiss authorities for another month, as though all that had happened so far was that the opening moves in a long game of chess had been played, each side declaring the other’s proposals wholly unacceptable as they stand but containing elements worthy of further examination. It must be accounted a reverse for Russian diplomacy over the past months that the Western allies are so united, so that all the Russians can argue is that Mr. Selwyn Lloyd has been a little more conciliatory in form, though not in substance, than M. Couve de Murville and Mr. Elerter.
It was hoped that after Mr. Macmillan’s visit M. Khrushchev, who is very quick on the uptake, was heeding the warning that strong language is of its nature dangerous language ; that it is easy to say too much : and M. Khrushchev has in fact been careful, when commenting self-confidently on some of the large statements of American Generals on what American power could do to Russia, to append to his answers the remark that he is not threatening anyone. Elis difficulty is to get anywhere without threatening.
The present conference and the summit conference to which it is meant to lead would not be taking place if the Russians had not created a crisis over Berlin ; but, having secured their conference, they are finding that it is not easy to make much of it. A little has been achieved for the East German Communists. A reference in one of the Soviet statements to the two German States was allowed to pass by the Western representatives, and that can be claimed as more juridical recognition than these Communist stooges had yet received.
The Russians see a way of forcing the Western Powers to treat the East German Government as a sovereign State, and/ if they find they are gaining nothing at Geneva we may expect them to fall back on this original plan. It is true it has lost a good deal of its attraction. The East German Communists, when put in control of the communications between West Berlin and West Germany, could be instructed to test the combativeness of the West without involving the Soviet Union in the indignity of having to climb down if the West proved too resolute. M. Khrushchev could prove to the world his desire for peace by calling his dogs off. But now there is nothing to explore. The Western Powers have made it abundantly plain that they are not going to be placed in a worse position, because they know that any concession would be exploited and made to lead to others. All they arc prepared to do is to sit patiently by the Russians and discuss, matching concessions; giving nothing for nothing but perhaps giving something for something.
Obviously the longer the Foreign Ministers’ conference lasts and the further apart the participants and protagonists show themselves to be, the less point there can be in the heads of Governments meeting M. Khrushchev, for the Governments, including their heads, are already present in mind and will at the Foreign Ministers’ conference. M. Khrushchev may feel himself in possession of a remarkable freedom of action, but it is probable that in the West we exaggerate the extent of what he can do without carrying with him a majority of his colleagues. But however much freedom of action he might enjoy at a summit conference the other heads of Governments are severely limited, first by the need to keep together and secondly by their dependence on public opinion and the party and official support on which their authority rests. If M. Khrushchev really wants to see tension relaxed and armament expenditure reduced he must face the unpalatable fact that very large conciliatory gestures in deeds and not in words would have to come from the Soviet Union, to change public opinion in the Western world after all the ruthless deceptions that were practised on Western statesmen in the last ten years of Stalin’s life.
No doubt M. Gromyko will refuse to let Hungary be mentioned in his presence, and regards the Hungarian