THE TABLET, February- 28th, 1959. VOL. 213, No 6197

TH E TAB LET A WEEKLY NEWSPAPER & REVIEW

Published as a Newspaper

Pro Ecclesia Dei, Pro Regina et Patria

FOUNDED IN 1840

FEBRUARY 28th, 1959

N1NEPENCE

The Russian Orthodox Church: Its Place in C u l tu ra l Exchanges the Cyprus Agreement: How the Parties Stand. By E ugene C. H in terhoff

Seventy Stepney Families: P o r t ra i t of an E a s t L ondon P a r ish : III. By E. L. Way

Ethiopia Today: S tability in an U n s tab le C ontinent. By Czeslaw Jesm an

Robert Hugh Benson: Some Personal Memories. By S ir Shane Leslie

Portrait of Which Artist?: Jam es Joyce and the Jesuits. By C h r is to pher Hollis

At the Foot of the Cross: L en te n M e d i ta t io n s : I I I . Mary Magdalen. By M ichael Hollings

Critics’ Columns : Notebook : Book Reviews : Letters : Chess

SPEAKING TERMS

SHOCK” was l'lc favour*te word, a short, sharp word of the kind sub-editors love, which the daily papers used to describe M. Khrushchev’s elec­ tioneering speech on Tuesday, because in it he revived the idea th a t it would be useful for Britain and Russia to sign a non-aggression pact. This suggestion is not so much a shock as depressing, for what can a non-aggression pact add to the obligation which both Britain and the Soviet Union undertook when they joined the United Nations ? In the first flush of the alliance, following Hitler’s invasion of Russia, Sir Anthony Eden and M. Molotov signed a thirty-year non-aggression pact. But then there was no United Nations Charter. Now, in the present state of relations, when there is so much that is concrete and urgent—nuclear disarmament, the future of Germany, and, in particular, the future of Berlin—to sign a non-aggression pact, like talking of more cultural exchanges, would really be to underline that little progress has been made or is to be expected in more serious fields.

We are reluctant to believe that there was really anybody in the Prime Minister’s entourage so protocolminded as to hold that M. Khrushchev’s speech ought to have been resented, and even th a t Mr. Macmillan and Mr. Selwyn Lloyd ought to leave. It should be understood by now that the world in which the old diplomatic conventions were established is not the contemporary world; that in innumerable countries men come to power, and to the conduct of international affairs, who have not been brought up to know what is and what is not done in established practice. But it is straining at gnats and swallowing camels to agree to associate and talk with men some of whose substantial actions are found detestable, like M. Khrushchev’s attitude to the Hungarian people, and then to start taking offence at trifles. But every long-established Foreign Office has its share of officials who mind much more how things are done than what is done.

Undoubtedly the most useful thing said in public during this Russian visit was Mr. Macmillan’s reference to the danger of war coming “ through muddle and miscalculation.” That is how most great wars come about in modern times and that is how a war dwarfing all previous wars in loss of life and devastation could come if M. Khrushchev and a few other men in the Soviet Union miscalculate and overplay their hand, as they are threatening to do over Berlin. M. Khrushchev seemed pleased when Mr. Macmillan noted that what is closest to M. Khrushchev’s heart is the industrial expansion of the Soviet Union. We can be sure he does not wish to jeopardise this. But history has plenty of warnings of statesmen who have, in fact, lost everything because they thought they would not be resisted and then found that they were. The course of events is all too familiar, by which a strong attitude is taken up for the purpose of driving a hard bargain, and then the loss of face at home and abroad makes withdrawal seem too difficult and humiliating, and in preference the last cards are played. The war of 1914 is a classical illustration of this process culminating in world disaster.

In the first half of Mr. Macmillan’s visit the talks were to have been on the subjects where agreement could most easily be hoped for, about more cultural exchanges and the deadlock at Geneva, where there is such an evident common interest in ending nuclear tests. If Germany is really thoroughy discussed, it will be only after the ice has been broken and the two men have found that they can talk exhaustively.