THE TABLET May ISth, 1957. VOL. 209, No. 6104

THE T4 BLET

Published as a Newspaper

A WEEKLY NEWSPAPER & REVIEW

Pro Ecclesia Dei, Pro Regina et Patria

FOUNDED IN 1840

MAY 18th, 1957

NINEPENCE

Distant Carrots: Pension Schemes and Inflation

Halt* a Loaf: The Balance Sheet in M. Gomulka’s Poland. By Aubcron Herbert towards Painless Classification: views on Eleven-Plus. By Morgan v. Sweeney An Unrecognised Recusant: Pakington of Harvington Hall. By L. A. Webster

Critics’ Columns : Notebook : Book Reviews : Letters : Chess

A NEW CHAPTER

A NNOUNCING that British ships have the all-clear.from * * the Government to use the Suez Canal, and to pay the tolls in sterling that will not be blocked, Mr. Macmillan remarked appositely enough that this is not the end of the story. It is a decision taken for commercial reasons to maintain the competitiveness of the British merchant marine. Very little has been secured—less than was agreed last October in the way of guarantees about how the Canal is to be administered. No one can be surprised if the Egyptian insistence on national sovereignty has been more and not less emphatic since the events of November.

There has been very little use of the existing courts of international law to establish the legality or illegality of the act of nationalisation, which involves the question of what claims the Canal Company may have against those who use its property but pay the Egyptian Government which is in physical possession.

conscious that there are great advantages in the presence of foreign companies. But there will be a steady pressure all the time to diminish the wealth that is allowed to remain in foreign hands. The great strength of the consumers is that they are the consumers; that unless they buy the oil these countries will remain as poor as they were; and so the essentials are present for a fruitful commercial relationship, provided it is not bedevilled by attempts to make these local populations believe that in the end they have got to do what they are told.

The oil supplies of Europe, after a six-months’ stoppage of the Canal, are now normal, thanks to American supplies, and thanks also to the way Middle Eastern supplies were maintained. Only one pipe-line was cut, and there was no serious sabotage. For six months Europe lost the use of the Canal, but did not lose either Middle Eastern or American oil, though both sources of supply had been gravely jeopardised by the same violent military action.

Meanwhile, the whole unhappy episode has given a great impetus to plans for the construction of more and larger pipe-lines from the Persian Gulf area to the Mediterranean, and of larger tankers. These developments would have come about in any case to meet the anticipated growing demand in Europe for oil. Pipe-lines are highly vulnerable, and no great capital undertakings should be embarked upon without a clear recognition of the risks. The more capital is sunk in the Middle East, the more and not the less necessary is it to keep relations with the local population on a strictly commercial basis. It is a grave mistake to argue in the opposite sense, that because our interests are great, we should wave big sticks.

King Saud, on his visit to Baghdad, has been discussing joint Arab projects for the building of Arab tankers. The purpose they would serve would be to increase the independence of local Governments if they wish to nationalise the oil companies. It was one of Dr. Mossadeq's main weaknesses that Persia had no means of moving the oil when he seized Abadan. No one should be surprised if the rulers and peoples of the Middle East do not for long stay content even with 50 per cent of the wealth that wells up from underneath their feet; or if they plan for the day when they need do no more than pay for the technicians who produce it and the installations which are necessary. Their vision is that of Socialists in other countries—to take over lucrative industries for the benefit, as it will be claimed, of the people as a whole. There will be prudent rulers who will be

The young King of Jordan has mastered his opponents for the time being. But he st'll has a most difficult battle, with the weight of forces inside Jordan against him. It is an open question whether the American gestures of sympathy and support had in these first rounds any appreciable effect. It is always fortifying to morale to know that you have a rich and strong friend, and the American action in support of King Hussein has been a parallel and a rejoinder to the Russian support for the present Governments of Egypt and Syria, a heartening cry to say, “ You can rely on us ” ; to which these local Governments reply that, while they appreciate such offers, their strength is essentially their own.

King Hussein has enough Jordanians behind him to remain the master of the State and the Army for the present, but the question is, to what sort of future is he leading the Jordanians ? What local allies can he point to ? How can he avoid seeming an obstacle to the growth of Arab power ?

If the Americans are not unpopular as Britain and France are unpopular, it is almost entirely because the Americans opposed Britain and France last autumn. That is the reason for such standing as they enjoy, and it is quite absurd to imagine that they are not aware of this, or now wish they had sided with us and the French in November. leaving the Soviet Union as the only agreeable Power in the eyes of the Moslem world. The decisive difference