THE TABLET December 22nd, 1956. VOL- 208. No. 6083

Published as a Newspaper

I l I F T A B L E I ' A WEEKLY NEWSPAPER & REVIEW

Pro Ecclesia Dei, Pro Regina et Patria

FOUNDED IN 1840

DECEMBER 22nd, 1956

NINEPENCE

The Growing Doubt: History in Disproof of Marx

Puer Parvulus Minabit Eos : A Christmas Meditation. By The Bishop of Aberdeen

The Two Gospels of St. Thomas: The Finds in Egypt. By R. C. Fuller

Verse for the Christmas Season Notebook : Book Reviews : Letters : Chess : Latin Crossword

IN TWO MINDS

TT is equally inconvenient for both the Government and the Opposition if the United Nations, prompted and encouraged by the United States, falls down on the task it has shouldered in Egypt. The Government claims it as the chief positive good from their action, that it has brought the United Nations to life and brought it into Egypt; the Opposition, making a good deal more of the United Nations than is sensible at this stage in its history, go further and hope for even more. The truth is that the United Nations is still a very young and raw institution, and its vitality depends very much on the United States, on Washington’s ability to leads a very heterogeneous collection. That is why President Eisenhower is going to extreme lengths in unrolling red carpets for Mr. Nehru, with Mr. Nixon acclaiming the Indian guest as' representing a country which is “ the moral equal ” of the United States. It is through Mr. Nehru that the Americans hope to find solid common ground with the Afro-Asian block in the United Nations, to secure a programme to which Colonel Nasser, for one, will judge it prudent to conform. Englishmen who tend to be impatient with both Washington and UNO should reflect that all these new States would be in the world in any event, and only grouped at Bandoeng and similar conferences. If the United Nations did not exist, it would be the first aim of our policy to try to bring these countries into a common organisation with the Western world, and it would be acclaimed as a great feat of statesmanship if it was achieved.

Now we must be prepared for progress to be slow; but equally we are entitled to expect some progress, most of all from Mr. Dulles, who swept us to one side, saying the British and French ideas were quite wrong and calculated to promote the very evils they were intended to cure. Those of us who agree with Mr. Dulles that force by the Western powers, in the measure of its strength, only drives the Moslem world into the arms of Russia, which has no hesitations about identifying itself with the Arab hostility to Israel, are at the same time entitled to expect Washington to make up its mind. At present the President and his Secretary of State seem men pulled in two directions, knowing they must assume responsibility for looking after the world’s interests in the Suez Canal, but fearful of losing their present diplomatic advantage which comes in the eyes of the Arab world entirely from their having opposed Britain and France.

The British have indulged in enough imperialism to lose

Arab goodwill and friendship but not enough to dominate the area; they no longer command the power to do that in an awakened Moslem world. The Americans want to avoid a parallel and equally unfortunate half-way course, of being grouped in the Arab mind with Britain and France, after having weakened them both. For the viability of Western Europe, which is recognised as a vital American interest, the United States has for the time being to play the diplomatic game against Russia in detachment from ourselves; we can look over the shoulder of the player and give whispered advice what card to play, but we must not be surprised if our advice is not taken, or if the hand is not played with much expertise; we cannot say much about that, seeing what a record of failure our own Egyptian and Middle Eastern policy has to admit, and our successive inability either to bring our friends to power or keep them in power.

One of our new answers to the charges of having muddled away a position that was very strong in both Egypt and Jordan in 1945, is that the Americans were always working against us; that they made the same crude errors they had made about the Chinese Communists, whom they believed to be amiable agrarian reformers in revolt against feudalism, when they supported Neguib and Nasser, and in general the revolutionary elements for whose support the Russians have found it easy to outbid the Americans. Now the danger may be that just as the Americans neither understood nor supported our policy, we shall neither understand nor support theirs, and that they may fail as well, and all through the lack of a joint pursuit of common objectives, the keeping out of Russian influence and the safe delivery of the oil. Oil rivalries have played a part, but basically it has been the separate pursuit of national policies inside old traditions that has so threatened the alliance.

Our chief friend in the Middle East, the elder statesman of the Arab world, M. Nuri, the Premier of Iraq, has made a long speech, in which, by accident or design, he spoke very critically of Mr. Nehru at the moment when nothing is too good in Washington for the Indian guest. In Iraq’s experience, Mr. Nehru has opposed all the groupings for defence not only because diplomatic mobilisation, no less than military mobilisation, leads to the conflicts it is meant to avert, but also because he has not wanted to see Pakistan with any allies

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