THE TABLET, June 18th, 1955. VOL. 205, No. 6004

THE TABLET

Publish ed as a N ew sp a p e r

A WEEKLY NEWSPAPER & REVIEW

Pro Ecclesia Dei, Pro Regina et Patria

FOUNDED IN 1840

JUNE 18th, 1955

NINEPENCE

A f t e r t h e R a i l w a y S t r i k e : “ Inspired Improvisation” Saves the Consequences Expected C o l d C o U l f o r t o n T a x a t i o n : The Royal Commission’s Final Report. By George Bull A G u a r a n t e e d A n n u a l W a g e : Effects on the American Economy. By John Fitzsimons M i x e d T r a f f i c : Engines and their Drivers. By Thomas Gilby O x f o r d B l u e s : A Special Number o f the Twentieth Century. By Anthony Lejeune N o r w e g i a n J u b i l e e : Fifty Years as a Free Nation. By W. Gore Allen M a k e r s o f C h r i s t e n d o m : Always an Iron Curtain. By Michael Derrick B o o k s R e v i e w e d : The Prevention o f Cruelty to Children, by Leslie George Housden ; Mark

Rutherford, by Catherine Macdonald Maclean ; A Train o f Powder, by Rebecca West ; Accent on ■% Form, by L. L. Whyte ; a selection o f new pamphlet verse ; Essex, by Nikolaus Pevsner ; We Die Alone, by David Howarth ; Leap Through the Curtain, by George Mikes ; Most Likely to Succeed, by John dos Passos ; Stranger Come Home, by William L. Shirer ; The Five Miss Willoughbys, by Rosemary Rees ; and Scales o f Justice, by Ngaio Marsh. Reviewed by Letitia Fairfield, Christopher Hollis, Roland Hill, Peter E. Hodgson, Muriel Spark, Noel

Macdonald Wilby, D. K. Lewis and Robert Cardigan.

THE THIRD SURPRISE

T HE German Federal Chancellor’s invitation to Moscow came as the third surprise of the new Soviet campaign in Europe, described by some as the phase of “relaxation of tension.” The first surprise was the neutralization of Austria, by which one hitherto important obstacle to peace in Europe was removed. The economic price of Austrian freedom is considerable, but there is agreement among the Austrian people that it is a price worth paying. The second surprise was the rehabilitation of Titoism. It should lead Communists throughout the world to salutary reflection on the mysterious relationship between Communist doctrine and Realpolitik, for they were given to understand in no uncertain terms that what matters is not whether you were attacked or imprisoned for Titoist deviation after 1948, or for anti-Titoist deviation in 1955, but whether you did what Moscow told you to do and when you were told it. And as if to make it quite clear that Soviet politicians are not concerned with abstract concepts like “neutralism” but with the bare facts of power, Dr. Adenauer was chosen to follow President Tito on the road of rehabilitation.

At first sight this might seem surprising. Since the creation of the Federal Republic, Dr. Adenauer has had the questionable honour of being target number one in Soviet propaganda. He was the “henchman of the American aggressors,” and the “instrument of the Vatican,” and worse. There seemed to be little hope that the statesman abused in these terms, who so uncompromisingly rejected any dealings with the Soviet Union before the Federal Republic had been firmly committed to the West, would ever be an acceptable negotiator. One might have imagined Dr. Adenauer in the position of the unfortunate President Hacha, forced by Hitler in March, 1939, to sign the surrender of Czechoslovakia ; it was inconceivable, especially to Dr. Adenauer’s own opponents in Germany, that he could be invited, not commanded, to Moscow to negotiate from that position of strength to which his policy has been devoted.

The invitation is in fact an open recognition of Dr. Adenauer’s success. There is more respect in Moscow for successful enemies than for unsuccessful friends. The Soviet attitude to Austria, as well as Communist views on Tito and Dr. Adenauer, are as easily reversible as were previous policies—as easy as the signing away of Moscow’s Communist allies in Europe, in particular of the Communist parties in France and Germany in 1939. The loss of prestige which such inconsistencies entail can be more than compensated by the greater advantages which are anticipated. As long as it was possible to prevent the ratification of the Paris agreements by Soviet refusals to talk about the German question, or refusal to negotiate with Dr. Adenauer, these refusals were the order of the day. If now they are suddenly discarded, this proves only that other methods have become necessary.

This realization is a severe blow for all those always eager to take the pronouncements coming from Moscow at their face value. Misled by them, the German Social Democrats and some of the Free Democrats have persistently regarded the German Federal Chancellor as the only real obstacle