T S E T A B L E T , March Y lth , 1951

THE TABLET A WEEKLY NEWSPAPER AND REVIEW

PRO ECCLESIA DEI, PRO REGE ET PATRIA

VOL. 197, No. 5782

LONDON, MARCH 17th, 1951

SIXPENCE

FO U N D ED I N 1 8 4 0

PU B L IS H ED AS A N EW S PA P E R

AFTER SEVEN YEARS The Divorce Proposals in Parliament THE BANISHMENT OF ARCHBISHOP BERAN

The Church Under the Reign o f Terror in Czechoslovakia

BEGGING THE BIG QUESTION Mr. Blanshard’s Attack on the Church. By Christopher Hollis

THE EARLIER SOCIALISM The Disillusionment o f Robert Blatchford. By Michael Derrick

THE SITE OF THE SEPULCHRE

The Projected New Church in Jerusalem

MR. MORRISON’S INHERITANCE G REAT is the gulf between July, 1945, the fateful month o f the Potsdam Conference, which is still the great stand-by o f Soviet diplom atic dialectics, the m onth in which the Polish Governm ent was abandoned by its Western allies in favour o f a group o f Polish Communists hand-picked by the Russians, and March, 1951, with the announcem ent each week o f new military, naval and a ir commanders in the great A tla n tic alliance to h a l t Soviet Imperialism . I t was Mr. Bevin’s unenviable fate to be the Foreign Secretary through all th a t vast tran sfo rm a tio n ; and it is his lasting distinction th a t he leaves office with the public opinion in his own party on the whole convinced o f th e inevitability o f what has been done. The angry, frustrated rage o f the Communist radio, the small response th a t its slogans and its “ peace campaign” elicit in Britain, a re the best tributes to Mr. Bevin.

But the debit side is also very form idable, and will not look less as tim e enables it to be seen in perspective. The Britain th a t had played the chief European role in the defeat o f the Third Reich and the liberation o f Western Europe proved to have singularly little to say when victory had been won, and, in particular, took no lead in propounding a new concept o f European community, embracing the different national communities w ithout obliterating them , although the times were singularly favourable, and fo r different reasons the old in transigent nationalism was discredited in the three main countries concerned—Germany, France, and Italy— as well as in the smaller countries. W hat was needed, and what was n o t forthcom ing, was the active leadership o f the strongest and least battered and demoralized o f the European countries after 1945, which was G reat Britain. The Party Approach

Precisely the sam e sequence o f events under a Conservative o r N a tio nal Governm ent would have resulted in a country profoundly and dangerously divided, w ith many people quite genuinely believing th a t everything would have been a ltogether different between Russia and Britain if only the Socialists, and n o t upper-class reaction, h ad been in charge o f British policy. As it is, all th e fair-m inded supporters o f the L abour P arty know very well th a t, if M r. Bevin could not achieve anything with the Kremlin, it is because nobody could ; and this knowledge has stifled any serious agitation here fo r a policy independent o f the United States, such as has troubled in tu rn our European neighbours.

Mr. Bevin leaves the Foreign Office secure, in the affections o f th e staff there. While he was always master in his own house, h e was friendly with everybody, considerate and hum an, and, w hat was most im portant, his trad e unionism made him understand and respect the ju s t claims o f the service ; he stood four-square against the currents in the v party, represented by the la te Professor Laski, which wanted a Socialist Foreign Secretary to p u t the carrière diplom ats to one side and fill th e m a jo r posts with British Socialists, and to colonise and transform the Office from within in the interests o f a party doctrine. A weaker m an th an Mr. Bevin m ight have em barked upon th a t disastrous path , and opened the way to the spoils system. •

Mr. Bevin can also claim credit fo r the promptness with which he seized o n G eneral M arshall’s H a rvard speech in 1947, and caused its transform a tion in to the great scheme o f Marshall aid fo r European recovery ; and he is entitled, too, to say th a t under his leadership Britain has been prom inent and active, and often the main source o f concrete initiatives, in the whole netw ork o f economic committees which have b rought the countries o f Western Europe together so th a t they may assist instead o f competing against each other in the whole business o f recovering with American help.

Only a little less unfortunate was the failure to respond more intelligently to the American readiness to believe th a t the British know the Continent and to follow L ondon about European public opinion. There was, in the years following 1945, a consistent over-valuation o f the strength and p ro spects o f the European Socialist parties—even, fo r some years, a com plaisant expectation o f Popular F ro n t Governments with Communists and Socialists. There was a resolute favouritism tow ards the G erm an Socialists, and, bo th in Germany and Italy, a very slow and grudging appreciation o f the strength and merits o f the Christian parties. Towards Spain, Mr. Bevin tu rned the blind eye o f political bigotry to the very end : even to his last days in office.

W ith a singular and quite unusual tactlessness, The Times chose the very moment o f the visit o f the Ita lian Premier and Foreign M inister, as the guests o f the Government, to p r in t a le tte r from Miss Sylvia Pankhurst claim ing th a t Mr. Bevin alone was responsible for the extrusion o f Italy from Libya and E ritrea, when all the o ther Powers wanted solutions which, in one form o r another, would have preserved the Ita l ian connection with Africa. To have em barked wholeheartedly on a policy o f A rab friendship, to have made Britain the great protecting Power for all th e A rab world, was a policy with a great deal to recommend it, if it had been whole-hearted ; bu t it could no t be so as long as the United States, fo r imperative reasons o f domestic politics, was supporting the successful Jewish aggression against the Palestin ian Arabs. O f British policy towards Palestine under Mr. Bevin the best th a t can be said is that, while it condoned flagrant injustice w ithout securing the goodwill o f the perpetrators, and while losing th a t o f the victims, it ju s t mainta ined the essentials o f Anglo-American solidarity.

But the personalities o f successive Foreign Ministers are