T H E T A B L E T , September 9th, 19SO

THE TA A WEEKLY NEWSPAPER AND REVIEW

PRO ECCLESIA DEI, PRO REGE ET PATRIA

VOL. 196, No. 5755

FO U N D ED IN 1840

LONDON, SEPTEMBER 9th, 1950

SIXPENCE

PU B L ISH ED AS A N EW S PA P E R

IDEOLOGY OR FAITH ? Why the Definition of the Assumption is Abundantly Opportune

CATHOLICS AND THE ENGLISH UNIVERSITIES : 1864-1895

The Little-Known History of an Important Debate. By H . O . Evennett

CHURCH AND STATE IN HUNGARY

The Document Lately Signed in Budapest

A SAINT OF SIENA

By John Pope-Hennessy

BROWNING AND THE BISHOP

By Christopher Hollis

THE BIG BATTALIONS A FTER several weeks o f hard work the North Atlantic Treaty Deputies have ended their London sessions, having agreed on a short-term programme for the immediate production of equipment urgently needed for the Atlantic defence. On September 15th they will give an account of their discussions to the full session of the North Atlantic Council which is to meet in New York. But in the meanwhile the Governments concerned are expected to take immediate steps to repair the worst of the deficiencies disclosed during the London talks. The communiqué published a t the close o f the Deputies’ conference last Sunday did not specify these deficiencies, but Mr. Spofford, the American Chairman, explained in a guarded interview that they concerned both armaments and manpower, and that the Deputies have recommended to the Governments a high priority production programme of what is “most urgently required for the forces contemplated under the approved plans.”

utilize captured equipment and animal transport, they build under-water bridges, and they employ manpower regardless o f losses ; they move by night, they use refugees, infiltration tactics and guerillas. This is how the Red Army fought during the world war, and the same tactics have now been adopted by the armed forces o f all the Russian satellites. I f a conflict should develop in the West, there is no doubt that the Western defence forces would have to cope with exactly the same tactics. Building Up in the West

The lesson o f Korea, translated into the West European theatre, has demonstrated that lack of manpower constitutes the greatest weakness in the armour o f the democracies. Until the outbreak o f the Korean war the public, which had been much impressed by the achievements of air power during the world war, lived under the pleasant delusion that superiority in the air would be the decisive factor in every future conflict, and th a t it could compensate for initial deficiencies in manpower. That is why Korea has been such a shock for the Western public : here, on the one side, was an Asiatic army, considered rather primitive by Western standards, while on the other side was an overwhelming and uncontested air domination. Furthermore, the American air power was able to operate under very favourable geographical conditions, in a terrain where railways and roads are comparatively scarce, and where, owing to this fact, the enemy’s communications could be easily disrupted, while at the same time the British and American navies could effectively assist the aerial blockade by operations against the Korean harbours and coastal communications. Yet it soon appeared that even in such conditions, much more favourable for the defending forces than the conditions which they would encounter in Western Europe, the combined air and naval superiority was not enough to compensate the overwhelming superiority which the aggressors possessed in their ground forces.

The North Korean Army, like the Chinese Communist Army, utilizes the Russian tactics and supply procedures which so much helped the Red Army to defeat German technical superiority during the world war. It should be remembered that the Russians, unlike Western troops, live on the country, and are taught to be content with what their foraging parties can take from the population ; their standard of living is low, and they are accustomed to hardships. They

That is why many experts believe that the problem of military manpower is among those which call for an immediate solution. The lengthening of the military service in this country, as well as in France and Belgium, provides the right answer, but even this measure does not solve the whole of the problem, because it will take some time before the effect of the longer service period is felt. France, for instance, has undertaken to strengthen the Western defence by twenty divisions, which should be built within three years. For the time being, however, France possesses barely five divisions, some o f which are only at half their strength. To provide fifteen new divisions, France will have to train nearly forty thousand new officers and N.C.O.s, and this will take a considerable time. In the meanwhile, however, Dr. Adenauer asks for an immediate increase o f Western contingents in the Federal Republic, so that the troops o f Britain, France, and the United States would provide a screen behind which the Germans would build some sort of a defence force of their own. But at the same time French troops are needed in Indo-China, and British troops in Malaya ; and there is the Korean battlefield, too, which constitutes another drain on the resources of the Western Powers.

The Americans, although less directly threatened by a potential invasion o f their territory than the nations of Western Europe, seem to have grasped much better the urgent necessity for an immediate maximum effort, which would restore the balance o f power between East and West. They realize that the present inadequacy of the West European defences constitutes a terrible temptation to the Russians, who know that they could overrun most o f continental Europe in a very short time, and they therefore urge the Europeans to do immediately all they can to lessen that temptation. For their own part they have effected in the United States a most impressive partial mobilization of their own resources, both economic and military, and have willingly accepted all the consequences and sacrifices involved ; but they expect the European countries to do the same. What good, they ask, is it to help people who are not willing to help themselves ?

For all this, however, there are no differences between the