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AND RATIONALIST REVIEW.

[E STA B L ISH ED 1885.]

No. 37. ( N ew S e r i e s .) J U L Y i , 1899. M o n t h l y ; T w o p e n c e .

Contents.

W h a t is R a t io n a l i s m ? By A . G . W . . D o e s C h r i s t i a n i t y G i v e u s H o l i d a y s ? By Herbert Flowerdew . . . . .

O u r V i l l a g e s . By F . J . Gould . M r . N esisit ’s N ew B o o k . By Constance E. Plumptre

R e c o r d s o f R a t io n a l i s m A W i s e T e a c h e r ..... F r e e L o v e o r R a t io n a l M o n o g a m y ? T h e A g e o f C l a s s i c is m .... M r . G . A n d e r s o n C o r r e s p o n d s w it h a C l e r g y m a n R e c e n t F r e n c h Bo o k s .... R a n d o m J o t t i n g s ..... L i t e r a r y S h r i n e s a n d P i l g r im a g e s .—Ruskin’s Museum . . . . . .

S i g n s a n d W a r n i n g s

P r e s s ) . . . . .

R a t io n a l i s m in t h e Ma g a z in e s S h o r t N o t i c e s a n d C o r r e s p o n d e n c e .

( g le aned f r o m the R e lig io us

W lbat is n a t io n a l ism ? I t may seem that, at the outset o f the discussion o f this question, some apology is necessary for discussing it at all. Rationalism, as an organized intellectual force, has been before the public for many years ; its principles have been familiarized to thinking people by widespread exposition and discussion. Any hesitation as to what the word Rationalism exactly implied might very well be regarded as evidence o f ignorance; even the uninitiated, it might be asserted, would easily be satisfied by a simple and unequivocal definition. But those who have taken the trouble to put their conception o f Rationalism into a concise explanatory form will have realized that there are many difficulties in the way of success. It is doubtful, indeed, whether complete success is possib le ; whether, in fact, one can give a definition of Rationalism which will be satisfactory to all whose intellectual position is, in most vital respects, that of the Rationalist party.

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definition is at once the most difficult and most delicate of all intellectual processes.

On general grounds, therefore, it may be argued that the answer to the question, “ What is Rationalism ?” is by no means so easy as it appears to be at first sight. To illustrate this argument, it is only necessary to take a definition formulated by a prominent Rationalist, and examine it in the light of the opinions of his fellows on the same subject. To emphasize the matter, we will take the definition given by the honoured historian of Rationalism, Mr. W. E. H. I.ecky. In the introduction to his H is to ry o f R a t io n a lis m in E u ro p e he states that he understands by the spirit of Rationalism, “ not any class of definite doctrines or criticisms, but rather a certain cast of thought, or bias of reasoning, which has during the last three centuries gained a marked ascendancy in Europe....... At present it will be sufficient to say, that it leads men on all occasions to subordinate dogmatic theology to the dictates of reason and of conscience ; and, as a necessary consequence, greatly to restrict its influence upon life. It predisposes men, in history, to attribute all kinds of phenomena to natural rather than miraculous causes ; in theology, to esteem succeeding systems the expressions of the wants and aspirations of that religious sentiment which is planted in all men ; and, in ethics, to regard as duties only those which conscience reveals to be such.”

This definition of Rationalism is clear enough, but many Rationalists will doubtless find it lacking in comprehensiveness and accuracy. As regards the former quality, the definition restricts itself too much to the anti theological aspect of the spirit of Rationalism. Rationalism combats not only the dogmas and assumptions of theology, but all dogmas and assumptions whatsoever. Many o f these are due to traditional influences which have but little direct association with theology, being of a social or political nature. When theology was the ruling power, dominating and absorbing all other authorities, Mr. Lecky’s definition would perhaps not be open to this objection ; but at the present day, when theology is the source o f only a portion (though a most important one) of prevalent misconceptions of nature and life, there is need to extend the scope of the definition, so as to include all forms o f authoritative creeds.

I t may be remarked, in the first place, that definition in general is something of a fine art. Those familiar with philosophy and science will know that there is no part of a system o f thought which has to be constructed with more care than that pertaining to the definition of fundamental conceptions. I f these are vague, ambiguous, or incomplete, misconception is almost bound to arise and cause endless confusion. This is nowhere better exemplified than in theology—the ancient and eternal foe of Rationalism. It is amazing to contemplate the enormous mass o f theological literature which had little or no purpose beyond that of fixing the exact meaning to be attached to such terms as “ God,” “ Incarnation,” “ Transubstantiation,” “ Justification by Faith ,” and so on. Nearly all the discussions about those matters pertained to their definition. No two theologians seemed able to agree as to the precise meaning of the terms in current use in their profession. Hence arose those theological discussions which enlivened the intellectual atmosphere of our ancestors, and even yet supply an interest in life to rel'g 'ous journalists and other exponents of the creeds o f supernaturalism. In this particular case, it may be said that the difficulties in the way of exact definition are insurmountable, since the conceptions o f theology are either unthinkable or illu sory; but, apart altogether from the nature o f the subject in hand, it is recognized that the art o f

As regards the accuracy of the definition, several remarks may be made. Mr. Lecky says that the spirit o f Rationalism “ predisposes” men to attribute all kinds of phenomena to natural rather than miraculous causes. Many Rationalists would look upon the word “ predisposes ” as mild almost to inaccuracy. It is hardly too much to assert that no living Rationalist would for a moment think of attributing any phenomenon whatever to miraculous causes. The total exclusion of the miraculous is a cardinal point in modern Rationalistic faith ; and thus, while Mr. Lecky’s expression may justly be applied to the Rationalist of the Middle Ages, it does not exactly describe the Rationalist of to day. But, as Mr. Lecky’s purpose is mainly historical, this objection need not be further dwelt upon.

The reference to “ that religious sentiment which is planted in all men ” is sufficient in itself to debar the definition in which it appears from all hope of universal acceptance. The very word “ religious ” is a source o f unlimited discussion. It has never been satisfactorily defined, and it will not be, until our investigation o f it from the psychological point o f view is much further advanced than it is. But, accepting the term in the sense given to it by the majority of people, many Rationalists would strenuously deny that any such sentiment was planted in all men. They would point to the numerous cases in which nothing