GUYAU AND HIS CONCEPTION OF MORALITY.

S U P P L E M E N T TO “ T H E L I T E R A R Y G U ID E ; ' J U L Y ,, iS gS .

“ It has been repeated many times, not only in France, but in England and in Germany also, that no philosopher,

no moralist, has expressed with greater sincerity than Guyau that which Is best in the souls of our contemporaries—their present faith and its divination of the future,”—Al f r e d FOUILLEK.

We live in a phase o f civilization in which mental and moral problems present themselves with singular force. The wave of naturalism, which was so distinct a feature of thought some twenty years ago, is now followed by a wave of idealism which evinces the inability of the human mind to find rest in the affirmations o f materialism alone. It is for this movement of idealism that the writer of the present paper seeks to rouse a sympathy which may be combined with understanding. The idealism here meant has nothing in common with the superficial sentimentalism which denounces all science as inadequate and materialistic. It leaves intact the fame of Darwin, Buchner, Huxley, and their colleagues. In the particular domain which these men have chosen to explore they will ever remain giants. The fact that they did not embrace every field o f knowledge and study, and that they did not deal with the complete ground of inward as well as outward experience, does not justify us in neglecting the real discoveries which they have made, or despising the results they have undoubtedly achieved. The idealist’s respect for “ natural science ” (so-called, as if the mental and moral sciences were not also perfectly natural !) is not weakened because he recognises the boundaries of physical research, nor because he perceives an evolutionary process acting in the psychological as well as in the physical realm.

As champion of a high and clear conception of what morality may mean for us to-day, the young French philosopher, J. Guyau, deserves our attention and commands our respect and admiration. He wrote at

A CRITICAL MOMENT,

when morality seemed to become unstable, under the gaze of sceptical research, or of cynical indifference. He was born in 1856, in the midst of the storm and stress of intellectual agitation which is so characteristic of the second portion of our century. The very moment of his birth, his temperament, his education, and the intensity of his faculties, pre-eminently fitted him to act as a lucid interpreter of the spiritual life of his age, both in its destructive and constructive tendencies. In no way hampered by an antiquated system of training, he found himself, at the beginning of his intellectual development, at that very point o f emancipation from old creeds which even now a great many enlightened minds reach only after severe struggle. From early youth he possessed the advantage o f which Emerson speaks in his essay on worship : “ For a great nature it is a happiness to escape a religious training ; religion of character is so apt to be invaded.” And, we may add, religion o f thought is so apt to be lost. Guyau’s first and only religion was the idealism of Plato and Kant. The explorers of modern science, with Darwin and Spencer at their head, found in him an ardent student. He at once realized the importance of their theories, not only with regard to physical science, but also for the mental and moral sphere. Guyau became one of the most original interpreters of moral evolution, and indicated with supreme insight and lucidity the transforming influence which the evolution theory was bound to exercise upon two leading ideas in morals— viz., Obligation and Sanction. He clearly understood that a much more complete study of the whole of human nature, in its sub-conscious and conscious forces, had become a necessity. He says

“ That which I try to understand in myself, as well as in my fellow-creatures, is the human mind in its great complexity and variety. I f I examine myself, it is not so much for myself alone, but for that which is common to all men • I look at my soap-bubble to discover the sunbeam in it ” While, on the one hand, we find in Guyau a loyal champion of the exact science of closely-verified facts, he also claims freedom for speculation and imagination. Morality, while firmly based in the visible, will find wings to mount upwards to ever-widening prospects of ideals and hopes. In the facility of human nature to adapt and re-adapt itself to changes of environment, Guyau sees “ an intelligence and reflection becoming ever more perfect,” and he thus supplements the mechanical theory of evolution with the conception of “ a clear consciousness which is the very essence of all moral and mental progress." But Guyau always seeks to give morality a character of certainty. He proceeds by induction. Our deepest instincts, sympathies, and desires must be observed and consulted. We must know ourselves in order that we may lift our life to higher issues, or we shall descend to lower levels.

Guyau occupied himself rather with the question of the “ moral end ” than with that of the “ moral law ”— at least in the formal, outward sense generally attached to the latter term. His theory must not be regarded as a complete doctrine of conduct, but as a

CONCEPTION OF LIFE,

as a sublime philosophy of the destiny of the individual and of the world, rousing enthusiasm and inspiring to action. Too long have we been accustomed to associate morality with all that is formal, rigid, and antagonistic to selfdevelopment. We need Guyau’s genius to make us feel that, in its essence, morality is a principle of life, and underlies the ineradicable desire for life and development which thrills in every living creature.

Ethics, like poetry, is the criticism of life. It may, and will, become the force to move, lift, and direct us. This promise of elevating power Guyau’s eloquent book conveys to the souls of its readers. This man, whose ideal was “ fecundity of life in all directions,” has skill to save us from that appalling sterility of the modern spirit which mocks us amid the shows and splendours of physical science and material wealth.

The book* under our review is divided as follows Introduction, furnishing a criticism of different systems of moral philosophy.

Book i. On the motive-force of morality, from a scientific point of view.

Book it. Study of equivalents of the idea of duty (there are five of these equivalents, three of which are treated of in Book ii.).

Book Hi. The idea of Sanction. The author examines the hypotheses of optimism, pessimism, and the indifference of nature to human feeling and will, q'hough each contradicts the others, each tries to justify the idea of an absolute, imperative, and categorical obligation to right conduct. And Guyau concludes by asking : “ Between the three hypotheses of a benevolent nature, an antagonistic nature, and an indifferent nature, how can one choose and decide? It is an idle fancy to give man the law— Conform to nature. We do not know what nature is.” It is in this connection of the inability of external nature to supply light and radiance that Guyau pens one of the finest passages of the book. He compares nature in general with the ocean :—

“ Nature is like the ocean. To give an aim to Nature would be to narrow her; for an aim means an end. That which is immense has no aim. It is often said that 1nothing exists in vain.’ That is true in detail. A grain of corn is made to produce other grains of corn. We

* M ora lity Independent o f Obligation or Sanction . I!y M. Guyau. Translated by Gertrude Kapteyn. (Watts & Co.) xii., 215 pp.; 3s. 6d.